KNOW YOUR ENEMY: Japan!
WHAT are the compelling forces which have driven the Japanese armies into China, Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines? What are the strengths and weaknesses of Japan? This pamphlet supplies vital facts about the economy and policies of the country with which we are at war in the Pacific.

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Insofar as this pamphlet presents interpretations and opinions as well as statements of fact, it should not be regarded as reflecting the views of either the Institute of Pacific Relations or its American Council, but solely those of the author.

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KNOW YOUR ENEMY ———— JAPAN

BY ANTHONY JENKINSON

The Answers to 10 Vital Questions

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I. HOW LARGE IS THE JAPANESE EMPIRE?

Japan Proper consists of a chain of more than 4,000 islands lying off the northeast coast of Asia. The largest, Honshu, has an area of 88,000 square miles and the smallest less than 2 acres. The total area of the islands is 146,000 square miles—almost exactly the size of the state of Montana. Their population, in 1939, was 72,876,000—more than half that of the United States. If stretched out along the Atlantic coast of the United States, the islands would reach from Labrador to Cuba.

Japan's possessions are:

Korea: area 85,000 square miles; population 23,000,000 (97 percent of them Koreans). Korea was annexed in 1910.

Formosa: an island of great strategic importance; area 14,000 square miles; population 5,300,000 (97 percent Chinese). Formosa was ceded to Japan by China at the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5.

Kwantung Leased Territory: Manchurian base of Japan's military expansion on the mainland; population 1,657,000, overwhelmingly Chinese; area 1,482 square miles. Originally Chinese, Kwantung was handed over to Japan by Russia after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905.

Karafuto: the southern half of the island of Sakhalin; area 14,000 square miles; population 332,000. Karafuto also was acquired from Russia in 1905. The northern half of Sakhalin belongs to the Soviet Union.

Mandated Islands: the three main groups, the Carolinas, Marilans, and Marshalls, have a total area of only 830 square miles and a population of 120,000—half of them Japanese. The islands were seized by Japan from Germany during World War I, and were mandated to her by the Treaty of Versailles.
They lie directly athwart United States lines of communication between Hawaii and the Philippines and also form stepping-stones to Australia.

Spratly Islands: a small cluster in the South China Sea between Indo-China and Borneo. They were seized by Japan in March 1939.

The total area of Japan Proper and her possessions is therefore 261,300 square miles, or a little less than the area of Texas, and the total population is 102,784,000. However, in addition Japan has controlled since 1931 Manchuria, which has an area of 503,013 square miles and a population of 39,454,025 (95.1 percent Chinese). Today Japan also controls Indo-China, area 285,800 square miles, population 23,853,900; and Thailand, area 200,000 square miles, population 15,000,000.

II. IS JAPAN SELF-SUFFICIENT IN FOOD?

Despite the fact that, in 1939, over 14,000,000 Japanese were engaged in agriculture as opposed to less than 6,000,000 in industry, the Minister of Agriculture was obliged to give warning toward the end of 1940 of a growing food shortage. In May 1941 flour was added to the list of rationed foods, which already included rice (the staple diet of the Japanese people), and sugar (which is mostly imported from Formosa). Although more than half of Japan's total agricultural output is rice, she has for the past two years been the world's biggest importer of that food. In 1940 she imported 100,000,000 bushels, mostly from Indo-China and Thailand, as against a domestic production of 300,000,000 bushels.

Before 1937, the year the "China Incident" began, while there was no chronic food shortage there was always a food problem due to the basic limitations of Japan's agricultural structure. The country is mountainous, and only 30 percent of the total area is cultivable. By 1937, 10 percent was already being cultivated. Accordingly, to match the growth in population from 50,233,000 in 1900 to 72,876,000 in 1930, agricultural output had to be increased more by intensification of existing cultivation than by opening up new land. Intensification was aided by the mild climate of Japan which in many places permits two crops to be harvested a year—wheat or barley generally following rice. But intensification has its limits, set by the poverty of the farmers and the small size of their farms. An investigation carried out in 1937 by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture showed that most of Japan's farm families border on destitution. In that year three-quarters of the 5,673,000 farm households owned less than 2.5 acres each. (The average size of a farm in the United States is 155 acres.) Seventy percent of the farmers rented all or part of their land from the landlords, who exacted rent calculated at seven times that paid in England. Rice rents are usually paid in kind; on an average the farmer hands over to the landlord more than half his crop.

The lot of the peasant-owners is little better. For the most part they own tiny farms in the uplands, where the soil is less fertile. In 1937, 50 percent of Japanese landowners owned only 5 percent of the land, while 8 percent owned 50 percent.

Thus the poverty of the farmers and the small size of their farms prevent the application of the improved methods of production and machinery necessary to achieve maximum output.

The war brought new food problems to Japan:

1. The Army was largely recruited from the land. The resulting farm labor shortage was aggravated by the drift of men and women from the countryside into the war industries. In 1939, for example, thirty-two towns in Japan of more than 100,000 had a total population of 11,500,000; by 1939, forty-two such towns had a population of 20,000,000. In this same period the number of agricultural households declined by 100,000.

2. A serious shortage of fertilizer arose. In past years Japan had imported most of her phosphates from the Americas and North Africa. In 1937, in order to save foreign exchange for the purchase of war materials, she started to cut down on phosphate imports. These ceased altogether, following the British-American embargoes clamped down in July 1941. As a result, irreparable damage is being done to the soil of Japan. Domestic production of chemical fertilizer is handicapped by lack of machinery. Secondary sources—fishmeal and animal manure—have also been curtailed; gasoline rations to fishermen have been drastically cut, and horses have been shipped to the armies in China and elsewhere.
3. The Japanese have had to export rice to support their armies in China. This is due to the "unreasonableness" of the Chinese in the occupied areas in refusing to grow enough rice for that purpose. The Japanese soldiers demand that they be sent good quality rice from the homeland, rather than inferior rice from Southeast Asia. As a consequence, the urban population of Japan now depends for half its rice supply on imports from Indo-China, Thailand and Formosa. This "Rice Line" passes through the South China Sea, and is vulnerable to attack by Allied sea power.

4. Loss of the U.S. silk market has brought destitution to many Japanese farmers. Prior to 1939, Japanese farmers produced 75 percent of the world's silk supply. For years the United States had bought 80 percent of Japan's silk exports. Silk-raising is for the most part supplementary to crop farming, so that many of Japan's rice growers suddenly found themselves cut off from their best source of income.

5. Restrictions of fodder imports have cut down the number of livestock.

6. The gasoline shortage has tied up a large part of the Japanese fishing fleet. In 1938 Japan had 560,000 fishermen and their catch formed an important part of the nation's diet. Proteins which the Westerner gets from meat are obtained by the Japanese largely from fish.

III. IS JAPAN SELF-SUFFICIENT IN RAW MATERIALS?

Japan started the war the worst equipped of all the Great Powers in raw materials. Japan Proper has an abundance only of raw silk and magnesiam.

Coal: In 1936, together with her possessions and Manchuria, she produced 43,803,000 tons of coal, which constituted 96 percent of her requirements. Subsequently, however, she has experienced a shortage of coal, which has seriously handicapped her entire industrial program. This shortage is primarily due to labor shortage and to declining labor productivity; the declining standard of living of the miners and the deterioration of their footwear due to the rubber shortage affected their output. Japanese plans to exploit the coal resources of the conquered areas of China have gone awry largely owing to the activities of the Chinese guerrillas. The guerrillas prevent the invaders from utilizing the rich deposits of Shanxi Province by the simple expedient of tearing up the railroad tracks as soon as a consignment is ready for transportation. Coal from the big British-owned Kailan mines was steadily sold to the Japanese up until the declaration of war in December 1941, when the mines were taken over. Confiscation, however, may prove to have been a mistake: the Chinese guerrillas are likely to show less respect for the new owners than they did for the British.

Iron Ore: In 1936 Japan and her colonies produced only 863,000 tons—19 percent of her requirements. Imports in recent years have come mainly from British Malaya, China and the Philippines.

Pig Iron: Japan produced 2,007,500 tons in 1936, and Manchuria 394,100 tons. This constituted 77 percent of her demand. The remainder came mostly from British India.

Steel: In 1936 Japan produced 5,500,000 tons of steel, which gave her an export surplus of 134,000 tons. By 1939 her production had increased to 6,230,000 tons. After 1940, however, the level of production fell sharply; the figure for 1941 was probably below that of 1936. The reasons for this decline were: the beginning of the embargo on iron ore and pig iron exports from the ABCD countries; the coal and power shortage; and, most important, the ban on export of scrap iron and steel from the United States. Due to the cheapness of scrap relative to pig iron Japan had used an unusual proportion—sometimes as high as 70 percent—of scrap in her production of steel. In 1939 Japan imported 2,068,000 long tons of scrap from the United States—90 percent of her total scrap import.

By comparison, it should be noted that steel production in the United States for 1941 was 83,000,000 tons. However, probably not more than 25 percent of that amount was used for the defense program, whereas virtually the entire Japanese output was so used.

Aluminum: Japan was able to produce 40.5 percent of her aluminum needs in 1936. Her output increased until 1940, when
the Dutch embargo on exports of bauxite cut her production to the point where, by the end of 1941, it was only one-twelfth that of the United States. Lack of bauxite has probably frozen the figure of Japanese plane output to around 5,000 a year. United States plane production by the end of 1941 was more than 2,000 a month.

Copper: Japan produced 78,000 tons in 1938—82 percent of her requirements. She imported the rest from the Americas—110,000 tons from the United States in 1938.

Rubber: Japan produces no rubber. In peacetime she consumed about 80,000 tons a year. In the past her imports came from British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. At present she is probably getting enough rubber from Indo-China to supply her war industries.

Tin: In 1938 Japan produced only 28.8 percent of her tin requirements. The rest came from British Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, and Thailand. She is now importing tin from Indo-China and Thailand.

Wool: Japan has no wool. Up until the embargo, Australia provided the bulk of her imports, some short-stapled varieties coming from Manchuria and North China.

Raw Cotton: Japan Proper produces no cotton. Her colonies were able to provide her with less than 2 percent of her cotton requirements in 1938. She imported 25 percent of her cotton (950,000 bales in 1940 valued at more than $50,000,000) from the United States—an amount that constituted 15 percent of total American production. The remainder came mostly from India, with some from Brazil, Peru and Egypt.

Nickel, Lead and Zinc: Japan has no nickel. Before the war she obtained all her imports from Canada. Control of New Caledonia, Free French island near Australia, would solve her nickel problems. In 1938 she imported 52 percent of her lead and 63 percent of her zinc.

Oil: In 1940 it was estimated that production was 2,600,000 barrels of crude oil in Japan Proper and Formosa, 3,000,000 barrels from the shale beds in Manchuria, and 2,000,000 from the wells in northern Sakhalin Island rented from the Soviet Government in 1925. In addition, she was operating eleven

plants, equipped largely with German machinery, for the production of synthetic oil from coal. These plants produced some 6,000,000 barrels during 1940. Thus in that year production under Japanese control totaled 13,000,000 barrels. During the same period consumption, both military and civilian (already pared to a minimum), was 40-45,000,000 barrels. She therefore controlled the production of some 32.4 percent of her needs.

In 1940, however, she imported slightly more than 40,000,000 barrels—24,600,000 from the United States and 18,800,000 from British, Dutch and American wells in Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. Putting consumption at the maximum, 45,000,000 barrels, Japan therefore had a surplus that year of 8,600,000—an indication (assuming that she has had a surplus over a period of years) that she has a considerable amount of oil in storage. In this connection it is interesting to note that the 1934 Petroleum Industry Law stipulated that oil retailers must store the same amount as they sell in a six months period.

Estimates of the length of time that Japan can fight, using her reserves of oil, range from one to two years.

Lack of refining capacity perhaps constitutes Japan’s major oil problem. In 1940 she had sufficient plant to take care of slightly more than half her refining requirements. The cutting off of imports of specialized machinery from Germany and the United States, however, has seriously handicapped the industry.

IV. HOW WILL JAPAN’S CONQUESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AFFECT HER RAW MATERIAL POSITION?

On the basis of 1940 production figures, Japan can now get 18,000 tons of tin and 40,000 tons of rubber a year from Thailand; 70,000 tons of rubber, 140,000 tons of iron ore and a small amount of coal from Indo-China. If she controlled British Malaya, the Philippine Islands, and the Netherlands Indies, she would have access to 90 percent of the world’s rubber supply, and 65 percent of its tin supply—more of each than she could use; she could also satisfy 100 percent of her oil and 60 percent of her iron ore requirements.
Wherever necessary, however, the scorched earth policy may rob the Japanese of most of the fruits of victory. Cutting down 700,000,000 rubber trees has not proved possible, and until the dry season they cannot be burned; but many rubber processing plants, oil wells and refineries, tin dredges and other mining machinery have been wrecked. Japan will have to replace the costly machinery, and already she lacks machinery-producing capacity. Shortage of machinery was the main difficulty that prevented her from exploiting fully the resources of Manchuria.

Moreover, even though she should obtain the raw materials of Southeast Asia, she would still lack the domestic plant to turn them into finished products. Part of Japan's steel producing plant is at present idle, due to raw material shortages; consequently for a short time she could expand output, should iron ore and pig iron arrive from the conquered areas. But in order to increase production to a point where she could match the immense steel output of the United States, she would have to take time out, and set aside steel for the production of new blast furnaces, rolling mills and other plant.

Thus one thing becomes clear: the more Japan conquers in Southeast Asia, the more she will need a breathing space in which to build machinery and shipping tonnage and increase basic steel production capacity. In order to gain this breathing space, she will no doubt talk about her desire for "peace" and her "satisfied ambitions."

The real ambitions of Japan's militarists, however, are more accurately described in the words of the Tamaka Memorial of 1927:

"With all the resources of China at our disposal, we shall proceed to the conquest of India, the Archipelago, Asia Minor, Central Asia and even Europe. ... In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. ... But, if we want the gainful control of China in the future, we must shatter the United States."

The interval between Japan's conquest of new raw material areas and the creation of the machinery to exploit them will be precisely the time when the war effort of the anti-Axis Allies must be brought to a peak.

V. IF JAPAN IS POOR IN RAW MATERIALS, HOW WAS SHE ABLE TO BECOME A MAJOR INDUSTRIAL POWER?

The basis upon which Japan built her industrial strength was her abundant supply of cheap labor drawn chiefly from the poverty-stricken countryside. Japan's teeming agricultural population, unable to make a living on the farm, flocked to the cities; hence a vast and cheap labor pool was always available. Japanese business men made good use of this supply by keeping much of industry broken down into small units, scattered through the land and among millions of households. The 1930 census, for instance, showed that 53 percent of industrial workers were employed in factories using fewer than five workers; 70 percent were employed in factories using less than fifty workers. In some industries there were large-scale, modern plants, but the low wages being paid in the "cottage industries" enabled the owners of the big plants to keep their own wage scales down.

Utilization of this cheap labor supply enabled Japanese exporters, particularly exporters of textiles, to keep prices low and thus gain an initial advantage in the world markets. In this way reserves of foreign exchange were built up, for use in importing machinery and industrial raw materials.

Besides the supply of cheap labor, other factors combined to give Japanese exporters an advantage over foreign rivals. Though industry remained broken down into small units, financial control was centralized, thus permitting economies in purchasing and marketing. Moreover the Government took a hand in aiding exporters, particularly in the matter of currency manipulation. The Government also depleted gold reserves in order to pay for raw material imports. To a lesser extent, the supply of hydroelectric power, derived from Japan's mountain rivers, aided industrialization.

As heavy war industries developed, foreign exchange had more and more to be spent upon raw materials to serve them. Imports for the consumers' goods industries, like textiles, had to be cut, with a consequent decline in the standard of living of the people. The production index of consumers' goods industries rose only from 97.6 in 1932 to 121.4 in 1939, while in the same period the capital goods index rose from 96.2 to 233.7.
Thereafter, under pressure of war conditions, the consumers' goods index fell away sharply.

The need to maintain exports with which to pay for imports of war materials, however, remained. It could be achieved only by further burdening the people: first, by selling consumer goods abroad rather than at home; second, by reducing wages. "If the cost of export goods is to be lowered," wrote the Japanese economist Shintaro Ryu in March 1938, "...the only means seems to be to reduce wages." Thus in both its initial and later stages Japanese heavy industry was built up at the cost of the living standards of the people.

VI. WHAT ARE THE PRESENT LIVING STANDARDS OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE?

Cessation of all imports except from those countries under her military control has brought Japan's production of consumer goods almost to a standstill. The Government has nominally fixed prices, but since many goods have virtually disappeared from the normal markets most Japanese are forced to buy in the "black market," where prices are exorbitant. The cost-of-living index for thirteen major cities rose from 100 in 1932 to 116 in 1937. Since then it has gone up another 50 percent. There has been no corresponding increase in wages. According to government statistics, the average wage for men in May 1941 was 82 yen ($1.25) a month, for women 31 yen ($7.30). Half of each woman's wages was generally kept by the employer, in payment for food and lodging in the company dormitory. An average working shift was twelve hours, with fifteen in certain essential industries, such as steel.

In January 1941 a leading Japanese economist, Seichi Kojima, estimated that the standard of living had declined 40 percent since the outbreak of the Shino-Japanese war in July 1937.

War has brought no improvement in real wages; it has increased hours of work. The conquest of Manchuria and North China brought no benefit to the Japanese workers. The drive to increase exports in order to pay for an ever greater amount of war materials depressed the wage index in the textile industry from 75.2 in 1931 to 67.0 in 1938.

As early as 1938 the Standard of Living Report of the International Labor Office noted that 25 percent of Japanese families, and 37 percent of Japanese children, were not earning enough to maintain health and efficiency. Japanese law permits children over 12 to work providing they have "completed their compulsory education." In 1935 a survey of the larger factories of the nation showed that over 16 percent of the workers were under 16.

The declining standard of living of the Japanese workers is having its effect upon the productivity of labor. "Labor efficiency has become strikingly low," The Oriental Economist, leading Japanese commercial journal, said in 1940.

A 49 percent increase in the total number of workers between 1936 and 1940 was able during the same period to increase total production only 20 percent. In the vital metals and machine industries the production index fell from 145 to 138 (1937 = 100) during the year August 1939 to August 1940. In the same period the chemical industry index dropped from 105 to 97. One cause of this decline was the lower productivity of labor. Diminishing food supplies, and lack of cotton and wool for clothing and leather and rubber for footwear are undermining the stamina of the Japanese workers.

For Japan's rulers, this may prove as great a problem as the loss of military divisions.

VII. WHO OWNS JAPANESE BANKS AND INDUSTRY?

Japan's financial oligarchy is composed of great family trusts known as the Zaibatsu. Its leading members are the Houses of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda. Between them they own the greater part of Japanese industry, trade, banking and shipping. By 1937 they controlled more than one-third of the total deposits in private banks, 70 percent of the deposits in all trust companies, and one-third of total foreign trade. By controlling the banks, they controlled the smaller credit institutions throughout the country. Lesser financial concerns have challenged the Zaibatsu in certain fields, notably in the newer war industries and colonial enterprises, but they have not shaken their dominant position.
On July 30, 1941, government tax authorities stated that during the past fiscal year twenty-four Japanese millionaires had paid more than 1,000,000 yen each in income taxes. Total income of the twenty-four was 37,000,000 yen. The richest man in Japan, according to these returns, is Baron Takakini Mitsui, head of the House of Mitsui. The Baron has an income of 7,500,000 yen a year and pays an income tax of 4,450,000 yen. Next richest is Ichizakemon Sumitomo, with an income of 5,200,000 yen annually. Third comes Baron Hikoyata Iwaski, head of the Mitsubishi interests, with an annual income of 3,800,000 yen.

The State owns the railroads, telephone, telegraph and postal services, and the arsenals. It also controls eight banks, in which, however, private money is heavily invested. In 1934 the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company was set up, by merging the State-owned Yawata Works with eight private steel companies. In the new company, which by 1936 controlled 90 percent of the total pig iron output and over 80 percent of the steel output, the State holds a controlling interest and the rest is owned by the Zaibatsu, principally Mitsui and Mitsubishi. In addition there are many semi-official companies, mainly in the war and colonial industries, in which one of the chief functions of the Government is to guarantee the interest on privately held debentures, and to make good any losses.

The Emperor of Japan holds a sizable amount of the nation’s wealth. In 1927 his 3,800,000 acres of land, and the buildings and tenements on them, were valued at 637,234,000 yen. In addition he had 300,000,000 yen put away in the Bank of Japan, the South Manchuria Railway, the Yokohama Specie Bank, Nippon Yusen Kaisha (Mitsubishi’s shipping line), and the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo.

The State has played a conspicuous part in establishing the supremacy of the Zaibatsu. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868 (when the feudal regime of the Tokugawa Shogunate, which had lasted since 1603, came to an end), the State borrowed money from the bankers to start Japan’s industrial development and then turned the industries back to the bankers at nominal cost. Government legislation, such as the Major Industries Control Law of 1930, which ordered the setting up of cartels in each industry to control output and prices, has often worked to benefit the monopolies. It is true that during the 1930’s, when the Zaibatsu were still heavily involved in foreign trade and shipping, they opposed attempts of the military-fascist extremist element, backed by the newer war industrialists, to gain control of the State and to plunge Japan into war. The Zaibatsu feared that war would cut off their income from overseas trade and impose heavier taxation on them.

But as the war in China developed, narrowing the possibilities of foreign trade, the Zaibatsu shifted the emphasis of their holdings over to the war industries, thereby bringing their basic interests—in the sphere of domestic as well as foreign policy—into line with those of the fascists. History removed any fundamental distinction there may have been between the “conservatives” and the “extremists.”

The “Outline of the Establishment of the New Economic Structure,” issued by the Konoike Cabinet in December 1940, stated that the Government “is to be permitted” to undertake “management of an enterprise” but that “private industrial enterprise is to be the basis” of the new structure.

VIII. HOW IS JAPAN GOVERNED?

Japan has never achieved democracy. Efforts to breathe life into her parliamentary institutions have repeatedly been thwarted by the military-financial oligarchy.

Japan’s Constitution, granted by the Emperor in 1889, was modeled on that of Bismarck’s Prussia. It provided for a Diet composed of a House of Peers and a House of Representatives, the latter elected by popular vote; a Cabinet, and a Privy Council. Universal manhood suffrage was established only in 1925. The Emperor, not the people, is the supreme source of political authority, and the Cabinet is responsible to him rather than to the legislature. The Army and Navy Ministers, unlike their civilian colleagues, enjoy the right to direct access to the Emperor. Also, since they must be officers in active service, no Cabinet can be formed until Army and Navy headquarters have approved the appointment of the Army and Navy Ministers. A very important element in the Government is the permanent bureaucracy, which wields enormous power and exerts a conservative influence.
The leading parties in the Diet were the Seiyukai and the Minseito. Both were controlled by the Zaibatsu but the Seiyukai was inclined to be more conservative. Nevertheless, the lower house of the Diet succeeded, at least in part, in reflecting the will of the people. The Minseito Party won a substantial victory in the February 1938 election by going to the country on an anti-fascist platform. To that same Diet twenty-three working class members were elected, mostly from the Social Mass and Proletarian Parties.

As Japan became involved in the “China Incident,” however, and as her economic crisis deepened, it became necessary for her rulers to suppress all outlets of popular feeling. The Diet exercised little power but it did provide a public forum for criticism of the Government. As late as February 1940, Takio Saito created a sensation by inquiring, on the floor of the Diet, what Japan was getting out of the “China Incident.”

Criticism, however mild, could not be tolerated. Hence there grew up a strong Fascist-inspired movement for “reform of the Diet.” The Diet could not be abolished outright since it was granted by the Emperor and therefore is sacrosanct. Accordingly some proposed that its membership be reduced, others that suffrage be restricted to heads of families and Army and Navy reservists. To permit this debate to continue, and to avoid the necessity of holding the election scheduled for the spring of 1941, the present Diet was prolonged for a year—until April 20, 1942.

The political parties, having no constitutional position, fell an easy victim to the fascists. On July 6, 1940, the Social Mass Party was dissolved, even though its leaders were strictly reformist. A few weeks later the Seiyukai, Minseito, and all the minor political parties “voluntarily disbanded.” A move to form a Laboring People’s Party, to the left of the Social Mass Party, was quickly suppressed.

The only political party in Japan today is the “Imperial Rule Assistance Association.” This unwieldy organization, formed in October 1940, represents an effort on the part of the governing group to mobilize popular support for its Imperialistic program. Theoretically, it embraces all elements in the population—business, labor, landlords, peasants—in one big “fellowship of service to the Emperor.” It has an elaborate hierarchy of “co-operative councils” reaching into every city block and rural hamlet. But it has been a disappointment to its founders, for it actually exerts no political power and is merely an agency of governmental propaganda.

Japan is a dictatorship without a dictator. She has no Hitler, but dictatorial powers are exercised by a ruling clique dominated by the Army. Like the Nazis, Japan’s dictators have but one object: oppression of their own people and despoilment of their neighbors.

IX. ARE THERE TRADE UNIONS IN JAPAN?

Immediately following the dissolution of Japan’s political parties in the summer of 1940, the trade unions were abolished. Workers were ordered to become members of the “League for Service to the State through Industry,” an organization that had been formed in July 1938, and which by August 1940 claimed 30,000 units with a total membership of 3,500,000. In abolishing the trade unions, the Minister of Welfare said:

“Our primary aim is to drive Communist ideas and dangerous social thoughts from the minds of the people by ordering the dissolution of the established labor unions, which have a tendency to sharpen class consciousness among workers, which hampers the development of industry and disturbs the peace and order of the country.”

On November 23, 1940, the “League for Service to the State through Industry” was absorbed into the “Japanese Patriotic Industrial Society,” known as Sampo. Sampo, which is headed by the Minister of Welfare, claimed 4,500,000 members early in 1941. In establishing Sampo, Mr. Tsuneko Kanemitsu, the Welfare Minister, stated:

“Our Society can be interpreted as a wing of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. It can be said that the most concrete form of the I.R.A.A. is Sampo itself. In Sampo, all the trouble between labor and capital has been swept away, and they have been united under the banner of loyalty to the Throne.”

The architects of the “New Structure,” viewing “capital,
management and labor as forming one organic whole," ordered the workers in each plant to form a "co-operative body," with "the manager of the enterprise as the leader." Each "co-operative body" is affiliated with Same, and is part of the "co-operative councils" system of the I.R.A.A.

Shortly after its formation Same sent delegations to Germany and Italy.

The trade union movement in Japan was at no time numerically strong. In 1925 there were 457 unions with a membership of 254,000—6.5 percent of the total number of workers. In 1937 there were 93 unions with 605,000 members—6.9 percent of the workers. Most of these unions were industrial unions. In 1937 only 1.9 percent of the miners were organized and only 5.7 percent of the factory workers. Out of 1,000,000 textile workers, only 10,000 were in unions. This was primarily because 83 percent of the textile workers were women, whose company dormitory conditions of living forbade organization. On December 31, 1937, there were only 21,714 women in unions—1.3 percent of all employed women.

The best organization was in the transport and communications industries; here 33 percent of the workers (including seamen) were in unions.

A fundamental cause of the weakness of the trade union movement was its lack of unity. The small unions were grouped together into a multitude of federations, between which there were endless political and jurisdictional disputes.

These federations formed three main groups:

1. The largest was the Nippon Rodo Kumiai Kaigi (Guild Federation of Japanese Labor), formed in September 1931 by the merger of the Japanese Seamen's Union, the Japanese Federation of Labor, the Federation of Japan's Trade Unions (Zenro), and ten other federations. Kumiai Kaigi, which had 260,000 members in 1935—70 percent of total union membership—was the Reformist group within Japanese labor. Its leading principle was "Triple Anti"—anti-capitalism, anti-communism, anti-fascism. It was affiliated with the Amsterdam International Federation of Trade Unions. Mr. S. Nishio, its leader, stated as the policy of Kumiai Kaigi in April 1934:

"... expecting to develop the nation's industry through legal methods, we must at the same time do our utmost to prevent the future bankruptcy of the nation's industry by dint of our principle, namely, industrial co-operation. For this purpose we must endure wage cuts with tears in our eyes and attempt to decrease the layoffs of thirty workers to twenty."

2. The second group was formed by the "legal left" unions. Their central body was the National Council of Japan's Trade Unions, organized in November 1934, with a membership of 13,000, through the merger of fourteen organizations. Head of the National Council was Kanju Kato, militant working class leader who was elected to the Diet in the general election of February 1936. Kato visited the United States in 1935. Second in importance in the "legal left" group was the General Federation of Japanese Transport Workers, composed mainly of streetcar workers in the leading cities, and having a membership in 1935 of 20,000. Also in this group was the Tokyo Civic Workers Union, with a membership of 1,000.

3. The third group comprised the "patriotic," fascist unions. Among these were the New Japanese Seamen's Union, the To-Den (Tokyo Electric Car) Patriotic Federation, and the Japanese Industrial Labor Club, with 18,000 members. These unions, which were the forerunners of the present-day Sampo "co-operative bodies," had as their slogans "Industrial Patriotism," "Unity of Capital and Labor," and "Down With May Day."

In 1935, understanding that only a united labor movement could hope to stem the rising tide of Japanese military-fascism, which threatened the existence of all unions, the "legal left" group proposed to the Kumiai Kaigi that together they form a united front. In many industrial centers the rank and file of the two groups achieved unity, and thereby strengthened their fight against fascism, but the leadership of the Kumiai Kaigi turned down the proposal.

"We are against the movement to unite under the beautiful name of the United Front including left organizations," declared Mr. Komakechi Matsuoka, President of the Japanese Federation of Labor. Five years later this very same Matsuoka was forced to abolish his union in order "to conform to the New National Structure."

That a united labor movement might have stemmed the
tide of fascism was indicated by the fact that, even though there was no co-ordination between the various trade unions, a wave of strikes took place in 1937, the year the China war started. In that year there were 628 strikes involving 213,525 workers—more than at any time since 1932, the year following the "Manchuria Incident."

At the end of 1937 Kanju Kato was arrested and the "legal left" unions were abolished. The reformist Kumiai Kaigi unions were forced more and more to conform to the demands of the employers. March 1938 saw the passage of the National Mobilization Law, which authorized the Government to impose compulsory labor service, regulate wages, and prohibit strikes and public meetings. Two years later all unions were abolished and their members ordered to join the "League for Service to the State through Industry." Each union had to surrender its treasury to the League.

In August 1941, simultaneously with launching an anti-Jewish campaign (there are very few Jews in Japan but many Nazi agents, who have considerable influence), the Ministry of Welfare set up concentration camps, under the euphemistic title "Preventive Detention Stations," for those trade unionists who were about to be released from jail, after serving long sentences, and who "have shown active resistance to the efforts of the prison authorities to convert them."

Thus, while Britain and the United States entered the war against Japan with their people participating more and more, through the medium of their trade unions and other organizations, in the conduct of affairs, Japan went to war with her trade unions and political organizations crushed and her people being ground ever more relentlessly under the heel of Nazi-Nipponese fascism.

X. WHAT IS JAPAN'S NAVAL AND MILITARY STRENGTH?

Japan's air strength (combat units), according to estimates made subsequent to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, is placed at 5,000 planes, as opposed to the 4,000-5,000 planes of the United States. American plane production, however, was over 2,000 a month by the end of 1941, whereas Japan's, due to shortages of raw materials and skilled labor, was less than 500 a month. America's total military plane production in 1941—including trainer planes and those sent abroad under the Lease-Lend program—was close to 26,000.

Japan's army was estimated at 2,000,000 with 1,000,000 held in China and Manchuria. The United States army was 1,600,000.

Comparative naval strength is estimated in the following table (exact figures are unobtainable):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battleships</th>
<th>Aircraft Carriers</th>
<th>Cruisers</th>
<th>Destroyers</th>
<th>Submarines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Built</td>
<td>Built</td>
<td>Built</td>
<td>Built</td>
<td>Built</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2-1937 Navy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The building program of the United States allows for at least 500,000 tons a year, whereas Japan's steel shortage probably permits not more than 100,000 a year.

Due to lack of Allied bases in the Western Pacific, however, Japan has a preponderance of naval strength in that, the decisive area.

As regards merchant shipping, in 1937 Japan built 67 vessels with a total tonnage of 408,000, whereas the United States that year built only 27 ships of 248,000 tons. Today, however, this position is reversed. America's production program for 1942 calls for 8,000,000 tons of merchant shipping. By the spring of 1942, two cargo vessels will be coming down the ways every day. Japan, with her raw material and plant shortage, cannot hope to compete with this.

Early in 1940 Japan had 47 tankers totaling 440,000 tons—one-sixth of the American tanker fleet. In the event that she gains access to the oil of Southeast Asia, her tankers will be particularly vulnerable to Allied submarines.

In estimating the relative strength of Japan and the United

* Including possibly 4 pocket battleships, some of which may have been launched.
States it must be remembered that whereas the former is fighting only on the Pacific fronts, the latter is fighting the Axis throughout the world. Against this, though, certain factors may be observed, notably the growing effectiveness of Chinese resistance, the potentialities of the peoples of Asia, particularly the 400,000,000 people of India, in the struggle against fascism, and the presence, six hundred miles from Japan, of the Soviet Union. In this connection Germany's aviation expert, General von Bulow, stated before the war:

"Although the Soviet Air Fleet is well over 600 miles away, it represents a greater danger to Japan than the whole of the United States Navy."

Thus, for Japan, as well as for the democracies, the Eastern Front in Europe remains a decisive theater of the war. A German defeat at the hands of the Red Army will sharply increase the danger from the North to the Japanese, who remember all too vividly the severe treatment given them by the Soviet Far Eastern troops at Changkufeng in July 1938, and at Nomonhan in the fall of 1939.

Japanese imperialism will not easily be destroyed. Nevertheless, the United Nations, allying themselves ever more closely with the peoples of Asia, and taking full advantage of the long-term political and economic factors working in their favor, will assuredly triumph not only over Japan but also over the Axis as a whole.
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